Universal Serial Bus (USB) Flash Drives are nowadays one of the most convenient and di used means to transfer les, especially when no Internet connection is available. However, USB ash drives are also one of the most common a ack vectors used to gain unauthorized access to host devices. For instance, it is possible to tamper with or replace a USB drive so that when the USB key is connected, it would install passwords stealing tools, root-kit so ware, and other disrupting malware. In such a way, an a acker can steal sensitive information via the USB-connected devices, as well as inject any kind of malicious so ware into the host.
an observation time of only 3.35 seconds. When the identi cation of the single USB ash drive is crucial, such as in critical infrastructures, using a wide-band spectrum analyzer MAGNETO can discriminate the speci c USB device connected to a given host with an accuracy of the 97.5%, guaranteeing zero false positives. Such outstanding performances require only minor computations on a commercial laptop, further con rming the viability of MAGNETO.
It is worth noting that MAGNETO could be extended also beyond the execution of the boot procedure. In fact, by just extending the time duration of the observation window, it could be possible to monitor the activities of the USB ash drive when it is in the idle state, thus detecting any asynchronous (potentially malicious) activities originated by the USB device.
MAGNETO, though being of general applicability, could bene t the most those environments interested in strictly protecting the access to sensitive equipment -such as critical infrastructures and industrial companies. Indeed, under the reasonable assumption that only a few (brands of) USB ash drives are authorized (e.g., the ones distributed by the company itself), MAGNETO can be e ectively implemented on a reference computing machine, to detect any replacement or modi cation of the intended USB ash drives, further strengthening the enforcement of security policies.
We highlight that two main elements distinguish MAGNETO from previous contributions. First, MAGNETO is the rst solution to exploit the usage of unintentional magnetic emissions to address the threats posed by malicious USB drives. Second, we prove that the unintentional magnetic emissions from the boot process of a USB ash drive can be used to ngerprinting it, without any intervention either at the rmware or the so ware level, but only requiring to plug-in the USB ash drive. Besides guaranteeing the full privacy of the device under test, MAGNETO can be considered a non-invasive, minimal-interactive, and privacy-preserving solution, fully-compatible with read-only devices.
Finally, the open-source code and data of MAGNETO framework are available at [12] . is will allow practitioners, industries, and academia to verify our claims, as well as to extend the adoption of MAGNETO as a ready-to-use basis for their further so ware development. e sequel of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief background on unintentional RF and magnetic emissions, as well as an overview of USB security-related work; Section 3 highlights the assumed scenarios and the adversary model; Section 4 provides the details of MAGNETO; Section 5 describes the tools and the results achieved by using MAGNETO; Section 6 highlights the advantages and limitations of MAGNETO and, nally, Section 7 tightens conclusions.
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Despite being assembled in a Printed Circuit Board (PCB) through industrial-grade processes, any embedded device produces even small unintentional magnetic emissions, emanated directly from the integrated circuits.
e source of such emissions is mainly due to the local oscillator, that continuously emits electromagnetic waves at a given fundamental frequency, to provide a unique timing reference for hardware and so ware operations executed by the embedded device. Even being narrow-band, the signal emi ed by the oscillator creates also several harmonics, i.e., components at frequencies multiple than the fundamental tone, characterized by a non-negligible power spectral density. Such harmonics couple with very small integrated wires on the embedded device and create resonating e ects, that turn the wires into small antennas, emanating RF power [2] .
e physical e ects underpinning these phenomena are described by the physics fundamental Maxwell equations, and also speci c mathematical models are available in the literature, describing their complex creation [6] .
On the one hand, this phenomenon can be the cause of signal interference between devices operating close to each other. For this reason, any embedded device emi ing RF signals must be compliant to speci c international regulations before being available to the commercial market [15] . On the other hand, unintentional magnetic emissions e ectively represent a side-channel for any embedded device, providing useful information about the nature of the device and the speci c activities executed at a given time instant [13] .
To provide few examples in this direction, recently the authors in [7] provided a novel sidechannel a ack on mixed-signal chips, where digital logic circuits and the radio transceiver are coupled on the same chip. Using information leaked from digital circuits on a Nordic Semiconductor nRF52832 chip, the authors recovered the full AES 128-bit key, up to a distance of 10 meters from the target device. e authors in [50] and [11] identi ed that the fabrication process of embedded circuits induced variations in the electrical properties of each chip. By using RF emissions from 16 di erent microcontrollers, they were able to identify uniquely each of them, recurring to imperfections of the fabrication processes. Similarly, the author in [51] focused on the identi cation of the SCADA sensors and actuators in critical infrastructures, and measured the unintentional emissions derived from the execution of a speci c piece of code.
Another application in this context is discussed in [5] , where researchers used the unintentional RF emissions to achieve the classi cation and veri cation of IEEE 802. 15.4 ZigBee wireless devices that are widely used in critical infrastructure applications. In the context of the IEEE 802.15.4 communication technology, unintentional RF emissions have been also investigated in [14] and [37] , to build a system able to reject rogue devices.
Concerning generic RF devices, the authors in [45] demonstrated the feasibility of ngerprinting wireless devices by looking at the non-idealities of the emi ed RF signals. ey showed that each packet emi ed by a device has unique distinguishing features, that can be used to identify the transmi ing entity. Indeed, we note that this ngerprinting methodology requires the transmission of RF packets, and thus, it cannot be applied to non-RF devices, such as the USB drives.
Another use-case was introduced by the authors in [24] , where unintentional RF emissions and random noise waveforms were used to actively interrogate target microwave devices, recognize and classify antennas and terminations.
Recently, the authors in [8] used the magnetic signals radiated by the CPU to ngerprint heterogeneous devices, including laptops, smartphones, and additional mobile devices. is result has been achieved by precisely controlling the hardware, rmware, and so ware of the devices under tests, forcing the CPU to execute a stimulation so ware that enables devices ngerprinting.
A few works in the recent literature investigated the same context tackled by this contribution, i.e., malicious USB Flash Drives, with speci c reference to the BadUSB a ack [47] , [4] , [46] . For instance, the authors in [47] presented USBFILTER, a so ware solution providing rst packet-level access control for USB, and preventing unauthorized interfaces from successfully connecting to the host Operating System (OS). e authors in [16] proposed an innovative approach, forcing the user to interact with the connected USB device before allowing the device to be used, thus ensuring that a real human-interface device is a ached. e authors in [4] developed Cinch, a countermeasure against malicious peripherals leveraging virtualization techniques to place the connected hardware in a logically separate machine, as an isolation layer from the main and protected one. is layer depends on security policies con gured by the users to reject or accept interaction with connected USB peripherals. e authors in [46] designed and implemented GoodUSB, a mediation architecture for the Linux USB Stack. is solution defends against BadUSB a acks by enforcing permissions based on user expectations of device functionality.
On the one hand, we highlight that such solutions are speci cally developed to thwart the BadUSB a ack and its behavior [31] . Today, the vendors of the devices used to carry out the BadUSB a ack have xed the vulnerabilities, thus making the BadUSB a ack very hard to be realized. On the other hand, a ackers are still able to cheat both the above defense measures and the current anti-malware so ware, e.g., by masquerading the malicious USB device as a legitimate one at the time of connection to the host [47] . Especially in industrial companies and critical infrastructure scenarios, the impact of such a acks can be devastating, preventing the daily activities of the company and possibly leading to huge economic losses on the whole country relying on the target critical infrastructure.
Building on the preliminary contribution [20] , in this work, we extend the actual state of the art by providing MAGNETO, a framework able to discriminate legitimate from malicious USB ash drives, based only on unintentional magnetic emissions at low frequencies. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the rst to apply the theory of unintentional magnetic emissions to commercial USB devices, and to demonstrate that such emissions are a viable and e ective way to discriminate legitimate from malicious USB devices.
Finally, we would like to stress that, an additional element of novelty characterizing MAGNETO is its application to devices whose rmware and so ware is read-only, and therefore, they cannot be accessed by the veri er. We highlight that all the previous contributions on Radio Frequency (RF) ngerprinting require either the transmission of a RF packet by the device, e.g., an IEEE 802.11a packet in [45] and [50] , or an identical sequence of operations on known data packets in [11] , or the access to the device under test, that have to execute a speci c piece of code, e.g., the Ladder Logic Program (LLP) scan in [51] . e rst class of solutions restricts the application of ngerprinting to only devices featuring a radio. e second class, instead, implies that the veri er has direct access to the rmware or the so ware of the device under test, by deploying a rmware/so ware update to allow for the ngerprinting process. Indeed, this might be impractical in many scenarios-the prover could be read-only, or it could not allow the installation of an external piece of code-, while it could also pose privacy issues. Conversely, our solution exploits the unintentional magnetic emissions of the boot process of a USB ash drive, therefore, enabling the ngerprinting process without accessing either the rmware or the so ware in the device under test, even when the device does not emit any RF signals. Besides guaranteeing the full privacy of the device under test, this important aspect makes MAGNETO a non-invasive, minimal-interactive, and privacy-preserving solution.
REFERENCE SCENARIOS AND ADVERSARY MODEL
In the following, we assume two reference scenarios: (i) a private company; and, (ii) a critical infrastructure. Scenario #1: Private Company. We consider a private company, interested in maintaining very high levels of security and privacy for its own most important equipment and data. e employees of the company need to use USB ash drives for daily work, e.g., to transfer les between di erent equipment. Being aware of the vulnerabilities associated with the USB standard speci cation, the system administrator would like to deploy a solution enabling the connection of authorized USB devices only, i.e., brands and models that are not a ected by any known vulnerability. erefore, the company provides to the employees its own USB ash drives, characterized by a speci c brand and model. Only the USB ash drives of this particular brand and model can be used by the employees, while the use of any other brand or model of USB ash drive is not allowed. To enforce such a protection strategy, the IT system administrator deploys a host device on purpose, dedicated to the measurement and testing of speci c USB Flash Drives brought into the company by the employees.
By connecting the USB Flash Drives to the host, the system administrator could verify that the brand and the model of the USB Flash Drive are e ectively the ones authorized by the company. It is worth noting that the physical deployment of such a host device can be optimized to be located within an electromagnetic safe zone, where the electromagnetic interference due to other devices is limited. Scenario #2: Critical Infrastructure. We also consider a digitized Critical Infrastructure, such as the control center of an airport, a smart port, an electricity control station, a smart grid, or a train station, to name a few. Being very sensitive computing centers, the computational units behind these critical infrastructures are usually highly protected, and equipped with minimal interfacing capabilities toward the public Internet. As such, the usage of USB Flash Drives is allowed only for unavoidable tasks, such as the installation of critical updates to the system, or the export of data stored locally. Indeed, such critical infrastructures can be the target of malicious a ackers, aiming at compromising the operation of a whole country by shu ing down, e.g., its transportation or electricity network. us, the computing equipment controlling the operation of these critical infrastructures need to be carefully protected against any hazard, including the usage of malicious USB Flash Drives. To enforce such a protection strategy, we assume that the system administrator would like to use only a speci c USB Flash Drive, and reject any other one, even if it is of the same brand and model. To this aim, the system administrator could deploy a dedicated host device for the test of the USB ash drive, and to deploy a system enabling and supporting the unique identi cation of the speci c USB Flash Drive. As for the previous scenario, such a host device can be deployed where electromagnetic interference is minimal, to optimize the overall measurement procedure. Adversary Model. We assume an adversary that is interested in compromising the equipment of the company or the Critical Infrastructure, by adopting malicious USB ash drives. e speci c aims of the adversary could be manifold, e.g., injecting malware into the ICT infrastructure where the USB ash drives are connected to, redirecting the Internet tra c to malicious websites, or stealing information stored locally in the ICT infrastructure, to name a few.
To this aim, the adversary can replace the regular (allowed) USB ash drive with another USB ash drive, having the same external look and form factor of the previous one, but a di erent hardware and/or rmware.
is USB ash drive is modi ed on purpose to achieve one of the objectives listed above. In addition, we also assume that the adversary can exploit weaknesses in the USB rmware deployment and replace the legacy rmware of the USB ash drive provided by the company, injecting its malicious version [31] . It is worth noting that in such a scenario, the deployment of regular anti-malware so ware would not be e ective. Indeed, as highlighted by previous contributions [28] , a acks exploiting USB external drives can modify the rmware of the component in such a way to appear to host devices as regular USB equipment, e.g. a keyboard.
us, the anti-malware would recognize the keyboard as a legitimate component and it would grant the related permissions.
We also assume that the adversary does not have access to the source code of the rmware deployed in a speci c USB ash drive. is is con rmed by the fact that the rmware on-board of commercial USB ash drives cannot be changed and even cannot be accessed by the end-users a er the deployment. Indeed, even in the unlikely case where an adversary can access the rmware, we consider it extremely hard and impractical to reverse-engineer it to obtain the source code, and to re-deploy it on the same USB ash drive. Generally, the rmware is protected by intellectual property rights, the source code of such rmware is secret, and protected by multiple security layers deployed at manufacturing time, and not available for public download. erefore, we consider extremely unfeasible to perform the aforementioned a ack.
Finally, we notice that the two scenarios described above always assume an end-user that could not circumvent the deployed system, e.g., by not testing its USB ash drive before usage. is assumption is consistent with the scenario of a benign employee, not aware of the (possible) replacement of its USB Flash drive with a malicious one.
THE MAGNETO FRAMEWORK
MAGNETO consists of ve di erent modules as depicted in Figure 1 . We identify two modes of operation:
• Training Mode. During this phase, a local database is populated with all the pro les of the available USB devices, including the authorized ones.
is is the online operational mode of MAGNETO, where a new unknown USB device is tested to verify if its pro le matches the one already collected during the training mode. e details of the modules involved in the MAGNETO framework are provided below:
• Emissions Extraction Module. e role of this module is to detect, capture, and log unintentional magnetic emissions from a particular device. Speci cally, MAGNETO focuses on the analysis of the unintentional magnetic emissions leaked by USB ash drives at boot time, i.e., when the USB device is rst connected to the host device and it executes boot operations. en, the raw data consisting of: (i) a timestamp; (ii) the acquisition frequency; and, nally, (iii) the value of the Received Signal Strength (RSS) are passed to the Features Extraction Module. e operations of the Emissions Extraction Module are carried out with particular hardware equipment, able to capture magnetic emissions on the speci c operating frequency thanks to a suitable magnetic antenna. More details about the equipment used in our experiments will be provided in Section 5.
• Features Extraction Module. Starting from the raw data provided by the Emissions Extraction
Module, this module is responsible for generating the features of interest for the particular signal. Speci cally, this module operates in three di erent phases, i.e., Data Normalization, Regions De nitions, and Features Computation.
-Data Normalization. e data acquired by the Emissions Extraction Module are normalized by re-centering them to the minimum value of the dynamic range of the observation, and then, by re-scaling them by the value of their dynamic range. Specically, assuming x i is a sample of the distribution, and X M I N and X MAX are the minimum and the maximum value of the dynamic range, the normalized samplex i is computed as:
. ese operations are crucial to enable cross-comparisons between di erent measurements, as they contribute to eliminate any small di erence in the absolute value of the received power-e.g., due to small misalignment of the measurement setup.
-Regions De nition. Each value of the RSS reported by the Emissions Extraction Module is associated with a given timestamp and a speci c frequency. In this phase, the Features Extraction Module merges in the same observation vector the measurements within a given time and frequency regions, that can be con gured uniquely for any speci c investigation. e output of this phase is a matrix, containing for each identi ed region all the collected RSS values for the particular experiment. -Features Computation. Starting from the matrix created in the previous phase, the Features Computation phase is responsible for computing the features on each observation vector.
x N ] is the observation vector containing the normalized intensity of the acquired signal in a given time frame and frequency range, we consider the following statistics: (i) mean; (ii) standard deviation; (iii) variance; (iv) skewness; and, nally, (v) kurtosis, to precisely characterize the unintentional radiated emissions from each USB device. Equations 1 and 2 report the formulas for the skewness and kurtosis, respectively, where (X ) is assumed to be the mean value of the observation vector. If such a score is equal or greater than zero, the device is assumed to be authentic. Otherwise, it is discarded. Among the several possible classi ers available in the literature [44] , in this paper, we have adopted the one-class Support Vector Machine (SVM) classi er, since it natively ts our objectives. More details will be provided in Section 5.
Using the ve modules described above, depending on the scenario and the speci c objective, either the brand and the model of the USB Flash Drive or the speci c USB device can be uniquely characterized when connected to a host device.
Wrapping up, during the Training Mode, the unintentional magnetic emissions leaked by the USB devices are collected via the hardware equipment and the functionalities o ered by the Emissions Extraction Module. en, the reference features are extracted from the raw signals by the Features Extraction Module, and a reference statistical model is created by the Training Module and stored into the Local Database Module for future use. e process is performed for a large number of devices, to create a database containing an exhaustive number of products of the same device.
During the classi cation mode, all the USB devices are tested, by connecting them to a reference host device and collecting the unintentional magnetic emissions during the boot procedures via the functionalities o ered by the Emissions Extraction Module. e reference features are computed from the acquired signal, and then passed to the Classi cation Module, which provides a similarity score, indicating how much the stored pro le matches the provided one. If no correspondence is found (i.e., the similarity score is negative), the new device is assumed as unauthorized. Instead, if the pro le of the unintentional magnetic emissions is found to be consistent with the allowed class (i.e., the score is equal to 0 or positive), the device will be authorized.
It is worth noting that MAGNETO focuses on the boot procedures of USB devices, because they are strictly required for the normal operations of the USB themselves. Indeed, being loaded in the rmware, the boot procedures associated with the USB device should not be changed by a non-malicious user. Otherwise, any modi cation to the rmware (either intentional or not) will generate signi cant changes to the magnetic emissions during the boot procedures, indicating therefore that the USB ash drive has been either tampered with or replaced. Such modi cations of the behavior of the USB ash drive during the boot operations can be detected by MAGNETO and can lead to a timely rejection of the device. More details on the speci c modi cations that can be done when tampering with USB devices are provided in Section 6.
EXPERIMENTAL ASSESSMENT
In this section, we provide the details of our experimental campaign, aimed at measuring the performance of MAGNETO for the classi cation of either the brand and model of USB ash drives, or the speci c USB ash drive, according to the scenarios previously introduced in Section 3. Section 5.1 illustrates the equipment used in our experiments, Section 5.2 provides evidence of the consistency among di erent observations of boot operations on the same USB ash drives, Section 5.3 shows the results achieved by MAGNETO in the classi cation of di erent brand and models of USB ash drives, and, nally, Section 5.4 illustrates how MAGNETO achieves the identi cation of single USB ash drives using more advanced equipment. e code of MAGNETO, including the source data of our experiments and the tools necessary to reproduce our results, are available for download at [12] .
Tools and Methodology
In our experimental campaign, we used the equipment listed below.
• USB Devices. We tested the performance of MAGNETO with a set of total of 23 di erent USB devices, related to 14 unique models, whose details are reported in Tab. 1, including the model of the included Controller Chip, containing the local oscillator (mainly) responsible for magnetic emissions generation (we notice that the manufacturer SanDisk does not provide any detail about the controller chip). We selected these brands to create a large dataset, considering both the most used models and any possible factor a ecting the magnetic 
Device Controller Chip
Device ID HPx900w-64GB [19] PHISON-PS2251-09-V U1 JUANWE-32GB [21] FirstChip-FC1179 U2
AlcorMP U4 PNY Turbo 128GB [34] PHISON-PS2251-09 U5 Patriot 128GB Supersonic Rage Series [32] PHISON-PS2251-09-V U6 Rubber Ducky [17] Atmel 32UC3B1 U7 Samsung BAR Plus 32GB [38] Silicon Motion SM3267 U8 SanDisk Ultra 128GB [39] SanDisk U9 SanDisk Cruzer 128GB [41] SanDisk U10 SanDisk Cruzer 32GB [42] SanDisk U11 SanDisk Cruzer 64GB [40] SanDisk U12 Silicon Power 32 GB Blaze B30 [35] PHISON-PS2251-09-26 U13 Toshiba TransMemory 64GB [48] PHISON-PS2251-11 U14 emissions of such devices. Speci cally, SanDisk, Samsung, and Kingston USB ash drives are the top three brands purchased by users on Amazon-as of June 2019 [3] . At the same time, Juanwe, PNY, HP, and Mosdart are all positioned among the top 10 brands. In addition, we also selected some brands based on the use of the same version of the micro-controller. For instance, we highlight that the micro-controller of the HP (U1), the Kingston (U3), the PNY (U5), the Patriot (U6), the Silicon Power (U13), and the Toshiba (U14) are the same, i.e., they feature the same hardware chip, while the layout of the PCB and/or the versions of the rmware are di erent (e.g., 09-V for the Kingston, 09-26 for the Silicon Power) [33] . Also, it is also worth noticing that we considered di erent devices having the same brand, model, and rmware: speci cally, we considered 5 Mosdart, 3 SandiskCruzer64GB, 2 Juanwe, 2 Samsung BAR, and 2 SanDiskCruzer32GB USB Flash Drives. All the devices have been analyzed as provided by the manufacturer, without any modi cation to the legacy rmware. To prove the e ectiveness of our method, we acquired the magnetic emissions by temporarily removing the case of the USB ash drive. Indeed, the results provided in Section 5.3 indicate that the modi cations introduced by the case are unique, thus still allowing for the correct identi cation of the brand and model of the USB ash drive. Besides, we highlight the presence of a malicious device, i.e., a USB Rubber Ducky. is USB Flash drive is a cross-platform keystroke injection tool, able to work e ectively with either Windows, Mac, or Linux. It features a 60 MHz 32-bit processor, hidden in the form factor of an ordinary generic USB ash drive. It consists mainly of a CPU chip and a micro SD storage, used to upload malicious payloads to the host device. Once connected to a host machine, the Rubber Ducky is recognized as a keyboard. us, the host device accepts its payload, consisting of pre-programmed regular keyboard strokes, up to a maximum rate of 1000 words per minute [17] . e commands are programmed using a dedicated scripting language, and it is possible to perform a wide range of automated functions, such as password brute-forcing, binaries injection, shell reversing, as well as changing system se ings. Nowadays, it is mainly used by professionals, penetration testers, and system administrators.
• Aaronia PBS2 EMC Probe set. To collect the unintentional magnetic emissions radiated by the USB devices, we used the Aaronia PBS2 EMC Probe set [1] . is equipment allows straightforward pinpointing and measurement of interference in the frequency band from the DC (1Hz) up to 9GHz in electronic component groups, as well as the execution and monitoring of generic Electro-Magnetic measurement. As a probe, we used a 25mm magnetic (H) eld probe PBS-H3, covered with an insulating layer, thus providing a safe measurement environment for oscillators and mains lines. is probe is connected to the UBBV2 40dB EMC RF pre-ampli er, allowing for a clear separation between the useful signal and the surrounding noise. e probe is then connected via a low-impedance cable to a SDR. • HackRFOne So ware De ned Radio.
e HackRFOne SDR has been used to record unintentional magnetic emissions acquired from the Probe Set over a frequency span of 10 MHz, and to convert raw data (in the form of regular I-Q samples) into spectral power density measurements. Speci cally, the SDR performs a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) on the provided I-Q data and it generates, for each time frame, a tuple containing a reference timestamp (in milliseconds), a frequency (in Hz), and a power level (in dBm). Tab. 2 provides the details of the con guration of the SDR. the Gaussian Function as the kernel function, in a way to have higher classi cation scores when the features of the supplied magnetic emissions pro le matches the target one, and consequently, lower scores when the pro les do not match. All the experiments described in the following subsection have been conducted by collecting the unintentional magnetic emissions radiated by the target USB devices in regular laboratory conditions, without any e ort to reduce the environmental noise. Our measurement setup is shown in Figure 2 . Note that a USB cable extension was placed on a Bench Vise, to physically stabilize the USB device under test. In addition, this setup allows having uniform conditions for emissions collection.
e Magnetic Probe has been placed on top of the USB device controller chip, in a way to clearly capture the radiated emissions. For each USB device under test, ten di erent boot sequences were acquired, where each measurement was at least 3.35 seconds long.
Finally, for the data processing, we used a Lenovo Ideapad 320 laptop, equipped with an Intel i7-7500 processor running at 2.70 GHz and equipped with 8 GB of RAM.
Consistency of Unintentional Magnetic Emissions Radiated from USB Devices
Our rst investigation has been aimed at establishing the feasibility of uniquely identifying either the brand and model of the USB ash drive or the speci c USB device, based on the pro le of the unintentional magnetic emissions. Figure 3 shows two sample measurements acquired at di erent times, related to the unintentional magnetic emissions radiated from the same Rubber Ducky USB ash drive (U7), during the boot procedures. Because of the normalization phase occurring in the Features Extraction module, all the samples corresponding to given times and frequencies have a value between 0 and 1. Speci cally, First, we notice that the time duration of our experiments is enough to capture not only the boot phase, where the whole system is powered up and initialized, but also to acquire the following idle state, where the USB device waits for instructions by the target USB device.
By comparing the two gures, it emerges that di erent recordings have similar normalized power pro les, as per the time and the frequency. Indeed, small di erences can be found in the time domain, due to a di erent delay between the time instant at which the acquisition was started and the time instant where the USB device was connected to the host device, and in the intensity of the unintentional radiation emissions, due to the surrounding noise and minimal displacement between the USB device and the probe. However, even across di erent measurements, di erent acquisitions of the unintentional radiated emissions from the same USB device are consistent, con rming that their statistical analysis can be e ectively used for discriminating the USB brand and model.
Scenario #1: Classification of USB flash drives brand and model
e Scenario #1 described in Section 3 involves the identi cation of the brand and model of the speci c USB Flash Drive under test. As shown in the previous section, di erent brands of USB Flash Drives are characterized by a very di erent pro le of magnetic emissions. is motivates the use of relatively cheap equipment, i.e., the HackRFOne SDR, as the tool for data acquisition and processing. We recall that the HackRFOne has a maximum acquisition bandwidth of 10 MHz. us, this frequency span can be used only to classify USB ash drives brands and models.
We ran MAGNETO to obtain a precise evaluation of the classi cation accuracy that we can achieve, assuming the requirements of Scenario #1, adopting the previously mentioned features.
To enable cross-comparisons, we considered a xed observation window of 3.35 seconds for each of the acquired traces. is time-slot was further divided into a given number of time and frequency regions, leading to a di erent number of features characterizing each observation.
To provide su cient robustness to the classi cation, we considered a total number of 65 features, computed as follows. We rst considered a division of the overall observation interval of 3.35 seconds in two time regions and ve frequency regions, obtaining 50 features. en, we divided the overall observation interval into two time regions and a single frequency region (adding 10 more features), and nally a single time and frequency region (generating 5 more features). e detection of authorized devices against not-authorized ones has been performed resorting to the Support Vector Machine (SVM) algorithm. We considered 14 di erent models of USB Flash Drives (classes), i.e., {U 1, . . . , U 14}, and we performed 10 observations (measurements) for each class, for a total of 140 observations. Moreover, we adopted the 10-fold cross-validation, where in each fold, 90% of the observations from each class were used for the training. More in detail, for each class (USB model), we considered 9 random observations (out of the available 10) for training, and the whole dataset (14 × 10 = 140) for testing. erefore, as a result of the 10-fold cross-validation, we have 1400 similarity scores generated by the SVM classi er. Figure 4 shows the computed similarity scores as a function of the 14 {U 1, . . . , U 14} classes we have considered. For each class (USB device), we reported as green (100 samples) the observations coming from the authorized device, while we considered the red color (1300 samples) for the non-authorized ones. For instance, considering class U 1 ( rst column in Fig. 4 ), we considered 10 observation coming from U 1 and 130 coming from the remaining classes (testing set). By applying the 10-fold to the previous procedure, we obtain 100 samples from U 1 (green circles) and 1300 samples from {U 2, . . . , U 14} (red circles). It is worth noting that, in the vast majority of the experiments, the authorized USB ash drives report values that are equal or greater than a threshold value of about −0.9, while the unauthorized ones report more negative scores. A few exceptions can be found for the USB Flash Drive Model U7, i.e., the Rubber Ducky, which exhibits some red circles very close to the value of −0.7.
In addition, we remark that MAGNETO can distinguish the brand and the model of the USB ash drive even if the brands share the same controller chip version and same PCB layout. For instance, we can distinguish the speci c USB ash drive model among the HPx900w-64GB, the Kingston Digital 16GB Data Traveler G4, and the Patriot 128GB Supersonic Rage Series, despite these three models share the same controller chip and PCB layout, i.e., the PHISON-PS2251-09-V.
Overall, the selection of the threshold is key to determine the accuracy of the devised brands classi cation method. High values of the threshold, i.e., T > −0.8 guarantee zero false positives, i.e., no unauthorized brands are erroneously recognized as authorized, but also an increased number of false negatives, i.e., authorized brands erroneously recognized as unauthorized, and thus a reduced number of True Positives, i.e., correctly authorized brands. Figure 5 reports the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve related to Scenario #1, i.e., the relationship existing between True Positives Rate (TPR) and False Positives Rate (TPR). We can notice that MAGNETO can achieve a 0% FPR, consistent with the selection of a value for the decision threshold T > −0.788. With this con guration, MAGNETO guarantees a classi cation accuracy (TPR) of 98.29%, con rming the feasibility of MAGNETO in discriminating authorized USB devices from unauthorized ones. Higher accuracy can be reached by decreasing the value of the threshold. However, such a choice increases the FPR, too. We also notice that increasing the number of features slightly improves the accuracy of the classi cation, but also the computational requirements of MAGNETO, leading to increased latency in the decision-the whole process still contained within roughly 1s.
us, in the context of Scenario # 1, the system administrator can agree with the company owner on the best deployment con guration of MAGNETO, trading o between the desired FPR and TPR.
We also investigated the time required by MAGNETO to provide the decision. Table 4 reports the mean and the 95% con dence intervals of the time required to provide a decision on the classi cation of the data, averaged over all the tests performed to obtain Figure 4 , i.e., 19,600. Note that the reported values include the time elapsed from the provisioning of raw data to the Features Extraction Module up to the reporting of the classi cation decision by the Classi cation Module.
We observe that, assuming a number of features equal to 65, MAGNETO requires 4.54 ms on average, producing an outstanding minimum classi cation accuracy of 98.29%.
It is worth noting that MAGNETO can identify not only the speci c hardware chip but also the code that is executed during the boot. In fact, MAGNETO can discriminate also between the HP, Kingston, PNY, Patriot, Silicon Power, and Toshiba USB ash drives, even if they are based on the same hardware chip. Indeed, we recall that their PCB and/or the version of the rmware is di erent, and this leads to a di erent pro le in the unintentional magnetic emissions at lower frequencies during the boot operations. Finally, we highlight that the methodology of MAGNETO is still valid also when the USB Flash Drive is covered by a case. In fact, despite the case modi es the pro le of the magnetic emissions acquired at a given distance from the speci c device, such emissions remain unique, allowing for the identi cation of the speci c brand and model of the USB device. To provide evidence of these claims, we report in Figure 6 the aggregated results of the classi cation considering a total number of 17 classes, where the rst 14 classes (from U1 to U14) are the same in Figure 4 e similarity scores of the USB Flash Drives in the classes U15, U16, and U17 are similar to the other ones. On the one hand, this result indicates that the case distorts the pro le of the unintentional magnetic emissions; thus, the presence of the case in the recorded pro le for a given USB Flash Drive should be recorded together with the pro le of its unintended magnetic emissions. On the other hand, the results indicate that the modi cations introduced by the case are still unique, thus allowing for the correct identi cation of the brand and model of the USB Flash Drive.
Scenario 2: Identifying the specific USB Flash Drive
In the context of the Scenario #2, it is of crucial importance to uniquely identify the speci c USB ash drive, to protect the Critical Infrastructure against malicious so ware injection. As shown in Section 5.2, identifying uniquely a USB Flash Drive involves discriminating very subtle di erences in the pro le of the unintentional magnetic emissions, possibly spanning a wide spectrum. To this aim, more powerful equipment should be used, characterized by a wider real-time bandwidth resolution, such as the Rohde & Schwarz FSW8 Spectrum Analyzer, leading to an increased number of features, that could be processed by a more powerful processing unit.
To investigate the feasibility of this setup of MAGNETO to uniquely identify USB Flash Drives, we considered USB Flash Drives of the same brand and model, and we applied MAGNETO to identify them uniquely.
As for the setup of Scenario # 1, we considered a xed observation window of 3.35 seconds for each of the acquired traces. However, we considered an increased number of features, equal to 325, obtained by further dividing the overall trace of 200 MHz into four(4) time regions and een (15) frequency regions. We notice that the methodology to test the performance of MAGNETO is still the same previously described: in each experiment, we assumed a selected USB Flash Drive to be the allowed one, while the others were assumed to be rejected, and we used the 10-fold cross-validation, where in each fold, 90% of the recordings were used in the Training Mode, and the remaining 10% were used to test the Classi cation Mode.
We considered two di erent USB Flash Drive brands: the Mosdart (U4) and the SanDiskCruzer 64GB (U12), where ve and three items were available for experimentation, respectively. e results are reported in Figures 7 and 8 for the Mosdart and the SanDiskCruzer 64GB, respectively. As for Figure 4 , we notice that most of the green circles correspond to values of the similarity score higher than T = −0.8, while most of the red circles are located below such values. As for the previous scenario, the overall classi cation accuracy depends on the selection of the threshold. Higher values of the threshold guarantee zero false positives, at the expense of higher values of false negatives. To provide a quantitative measure of such relationships, we report in Figures 9 and  10 the ROC curves for the Mosdart and the SanDiskCruzer 64GB USB Flash Drives, respectively. We notice that the performance are very similar for the two USB Flash Drive models. When zero false positives are required, MAGNETO can guarantee a classi cation accuracy (TPR) up to the 97.5%. Even if be er performance can be achieved by accepting some false positives, we remark that the scenario envisioned for this application, i.e., Scenario # 2, requires full assurance of the speci c USB Flash Drive. us, in this scenario, only increasing the number of features can be used as a strategy to improve the classi cation performance, by always maintaining the strict requirement of zero false positives. e usage of more powerful equipment, such as the Rohde & Schwarz FSW8, is necessary to obtain such an outstanding classi cation accuracy. To provide a quantitative measure of the impact of an increasing frequency range on the performance of MAGNETO, in Figure 11 we show the FPR as a function of the selected frequency span, by assuming the selection of the same reference threshold value T = 0.9, guaranteeing F PR < 0.01 when the frequency span is 200 MHz.
As anticipated, increasing the frequency span reduces the FPR, for both the USB Flash Drives. Even if cases of zero false positives are possible also with a minimum frequency span of 75 MHz, using the full available spectrum always leads to the best performance. However, the system administrator always has to consider that such an increased frequency span implies using more samples and more features, increasing also the time to provide an output similarity score and a ecting the overall usability of MAGNETO.
Finally, we remark that discriminating against the speci c USB device requires more powerful equipment than a simple SDR. Speci cally, the equipment to be used should be characterized by a wide real-time resolution bandwidth, of about 200 MHz. Despite in our experimental assessment we used the Rohde & Schwarz FSW8 spectrum analyzer, other cheaper devices are available, characterized by a similar bandwidth range, with a price starting from as low as 500 USD.
Host Device (Verifier) configuration and its impact on MAGNETO.
e analysis and results reported in the previous sections have been obtained using a single host device, as detailed in Section 5.1. is is consistent with the two scenarios and the system model assumed in our work. Indeed, both in a company (Scenario #1) and in a critical infrastructure (Scenario #2), it is reasonable to assume that the system administrator has the full control of the veri er, i.e., the system used to acquire the ngerprints of the legitimate USB devices and to test new USB devices. Moreover, it is reasonable and convenient for the system administrator that such a system uses the same Operating System of the system(s) used within the site.
To provide further insights about the ngerprinting process, in this subsection, we extend our analysis, investigating the consistency of the ngerprinting process when the hardware and the so ware of the host devices change. As a reference example, we investigated the consistency of the magnetic emissions radiated during the boot process by a USB ash drive when di erent versions of the same OS are used on the same machine. To this aim, we collected the unintentional magnetic emissions radiated during the boot of a sample USB ash drive, i.e., the SanDisk Cruzer 128GB drive (U10), when connected to the same machine used for the previous tests, operating with the Windows 7 and the Windows 10 OS. e former includes the version 6. some small di erences are noticeable, especially in the duration of the di erent phases of the boot sequence. While these small di erences do not a ect the brand and model identi cation procedure (Scenario # 1), they lead to inaccuracies when assuming Scenario #2, where we aimed at identifying the speci c USB ash drive. We remark that, while we report the gures only for the U10 ash drive, the above-described behavior is common to all the USB ash drives analyzed in our work.
Overall, these ndings suggest that the construction of the Local Database (i.e., the training process) and the Classi cation (i.e., the testing process) required by MAGNETO should be carried out on the same system, guaranteeing both hardware and so ware consistency. When at least one of these features changes, di erences arise that, especially in the case of Scenario # 2, could lead to undesired mismatches. Conversely, when the system administrator only requires the veri cation of the brand and the model of the USB ash drive (Scenario # 1), ngerprints can be acquired and tested by using di erent systems or di erent OSs. We highlight that these ndings are consistent with other related work on unintentional magnetic emissions. Indeed, small modi cations to the hardware and so ware features of involved devices lead to di erent ngerprints.
Overall, our analysis demonstrates that the pro le of the unintentional magnetic emissions radiated during the boot procedure is mainly caused by the combination of four main elements: (i) the memory readings/writings of the USB ash drive; (ii) the so ware instructions executed by the microcontroller chip of the USB ash drive; (iii) the layout of the PCB of the USB ash drive; and, (iv) the hardware and so ware features of the host device. is is con rmed by several ndings. Considering the same micro-controller chip on a speci c host, we have recorded completely di erent pro les of unintentional magnetic emissions when considering di erent USB ash drives, characterized by di erent layout of the PCB. is can be veri ed by looking at the pro le of the unintentional emissions of the devices HP (U1), Kingston (U3), PNY (U5), Patriot (U6), Silicon Power (U13), and Toshiba (U14), sharing the same micro-controller chip but a di erent layout of the PCB. In addition, as demonstrated by the above analysis, changing the hardware and the so ware of the host device has a small yet noticeable impact on the ngerprints. When only the so ware of the host changes, di erences in the ngerprint of the same USB ash drive become more pronounced due to a di erent interaction of the OS with the USB ash drive, a ecting the nal part of the boot procedure. Considering di erent hardware (USB ash drive) on the same physical machine, we also experienced small di erences in the nal part of the boot. e discussion reported above highlights the e ect of the hardware and the so ware of the host device on the overall recorded ngerprint. However, we remark that the peculiarities associated with the magnetic emissions are both out of the scope of our work and technically hard to achieve when working with System-on-Chip (SoC), such as the USB ash drives. Indeed, matching the e ect of every single electronic component to the ngerprint would require isolating the e ect of each of them on the PCB of the speci c USB ash drive. is is very hard to achieve both via hardware and so ware. As for the hardware, disconnecting its components turns out to be very di cult to achieve, in particular when working with SoC, such as the USB ash drives, where all the electronic components are integrated on the same PCB. Disabling the components via so ware, instead, would require having strict control over the rmware and the so ware of the USB ash drive. However, they are not accessible by end-users and protected against source code reverse-engineering by multiple security layers. Overall, we can conclude that the di erences among the brands and the devices of the same brand are due to small circuits di erences, and inaccuracies and imperfections in the manufacturing process. On the one hand, the underlying process behind MAGNETO can be brought back to a speci c use-case of the Electro-Magnetic emanations of embedded circuits. On the other hand, we would like to recall that our work aims to identify either the brand and the model or the speci c USB device, including all the interacting components, as a unique device. us, analyzing the e ect of each component of the leakage is out of scope for our work. We also remark that MAGNETO is novel compared to other related work as, to the best of the authors' knowledge, it is the rst solution that can ngerprint USB ash drives in a non-interactive, minimal-invasive, and privacy-preserving fashion, not requiring any intervention or modi cation on the devices under test. Finally, we highlight that our methodology, i.e., ngerprinting the device as a whole, without considering the e ect of the single components, is consistent with all the related work investigating physical-layer ngerprinting and unintentional Electro-Magnetic emissions, including [5, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 24, 37, 45, 50, 51] . e physical e ects underpinning these phenomena are described by the physics fundamental Maxwell equations, and also speci c mathematical models are available in the literature, describing their complex creation [6] .
DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
e results presented in Section 5 clearly showed the e ectiveness of MAGNETO. We showed that, considering a speci c host device, the unintentional magnetic emissions radiated at low frequencies during the boot by a USB ash drive are (i) very similar for devices of the same brands, (ii) unique for each device, and (iii) consistent in time, thus being a viable and e ective tool for USB brand and device ngerprinting. For instance, assuming the reference scenario of a company, such as the Scenario # 1 discussed in Section 3, the system administrator can enforce the use of only speci c brands and models of USB ash drive, eventually provided by the company itself. To enforce the protection against unauthorized USB ash drives, the system administrator can deploy MAGNETO on a dedicated machine, acquiring the pro le of the unintentional magnetic emissions of the selected USB ash drives, before their use. en, in the case of a company, on a selected period (e.g., once a day), every time a USB ash drive needs to be used, the system administrator can plug the device into a dedicated laptop, connected to the proposed MAGNETO system. en, if the magnetic emissions at low frequencies during the boot operations match the stored pro le for the particular brand and model, the use of the particular USB ash drive could be authorized; otherwise, it will not. Similarly, in a critical infrastructure, such as in the Scenario # 2 discussed in Section 3, it is possible to deploy MAGNETO by using powerful equipment, able to acquire the pro le of the magnetic emissions on a wider frequency span. As shown in Section 5.4, using such an increased frequency span can enhance the capabilities of MAGNETO, to provide the identi cation of the speci c USB drive.
alitative Comparison with Certi cate-based Solutions. A certi cate-based authentication solution for USB 2.0 and USB 3.0 devices would require the setup of a dedicated Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), including a trusted Certi cation Authority (CA) between all the manufacturers of USB devices. According to well-known principles of Public Key Cryptography, this CA would be in charge of signing and releasing public key certi cates for each USB device already commercialized. At the same time, the veri cation of the authenticity of a USB ash drive would require the installation of the public key of the CA in each potential host device, e.g., laptop, workstations, USB-enabled equipment, to name a few, via a dedicated update of the driver of the USB controllers.
is methodology has several drawbacks. From the perspective of the manufacturers of the USB ash drives, the setup of a dedicated PKI to secure the already deployed devices would be highly expensive, and it would cause management issues due to the possible recall of millions of devices. Besides, it would require an agreement between all the manufacturers. From the end-user perspective, this solution would be almost impractical, as it would require the rmware update of each USB ash drive (to be done by the speci c user) and the upgrade of the USB controllers of each potential host device (to be done by microchips producers). is is why the deployment of a dedicated PKI is unlikely to happen for USB 2.0 and USB 3.0 devices already commercialized, and, in the best case, it would be practical, still at a high cost, only for future devices, without any update of already commercialized devices. Compared to the aforementioned solution, MAGNETO provides several advantages. Indeed, MAG-NETO emerges as a transparent, easy-to-use, and relatively cheap solution, that is implicitly retro-compatible with any USB speci cation. us, its usage allows the veri cation of any USB ash drive, without modi cations either to the USB ash drive or to the host devices. We also note that MAGNETO can be integrated with existing certi cate-based authentication solutions (such as the ones already in place to secure the USB Type-C connections), to provide a second independent authentication factor and further enforce the authentication of any USB device.
Another feature of MAGNETO is its linear overhead, independent of the amount of USB ash drives on the market. Indeed, the system administrator needs only to generate the pro le (according to the procedure detailed in the paper) of the USB he/she wants to add to the whitelist of the authorized USB drives. Once the process commi ed, any USB drive that is screened requires just the collection of the drive's magnetic pro le and its comparison against the pro les in the white-list. e operation has a cost that is linear in the size of the white-list. It is worth noting that the setup of MAGNETO is only aimed at protecting and ensuring the authenticity of the boot procedures.
is choice allows to timely detect a malicious adversary that: (i) replaces the regular USB ash drive with another one having the same external look and form factor, but a di erent hardware and (possibly malicious) rmware; and, (ii) can replace the rmware of a legacy USB device with a brand new one, by inserting its own code. Such strategies are common to the vast majority of USB a acks known today, as they are based on the complete replacement of the hardware or the rmware of a regular USB device [28] .
USB rmware tampering. Despite some USB ash drives are certi ed according to FIPS 140-2 Level 2 and Level 3 standards, USB ash drives cannot be considered as protected against tampering. Indeed, the strength of MAGNETO lies in the capability to detect the tampering, as the modi ed rmware would cause a modi ed pro le of the unintended magnetic emissions, raising an alarm. Indeed, the adversary might replace the rmware of the USB ash drive with a malicious one, where just the minimum amount of lines have been modi ed to trigger a speci c malware. We highlight that both the executable le and the source code of the rmware on-board of commercial USB ash drives, including the ones analyzed in this work, are usually not modi able and not accessible by the end-users a er the deployment-indeed, even in the unlikely case where an adversary can obtain the le of the compiled rmware, it is extremely hard and impractical to reverse-engineer it to obtain the source code. In addition, being always protected by intellectual property rights, the source code of such rmware is also secret, protected by multiple security layers deployed at manufacturing time, and not available for public download. us, it is extremely unfeasible to obtain it, and to deploy the aforementioned a ack. us, even if the USB ash drive has been tampered, MAGNETO can detect such tampering and reject the authenticity of the USB ash drive. Similarly, another adversarial strategy could consist in smartly modifying the rmware of the legacy USB device, inserting just a code line that postpones the injection of the malicious code a er the execution of the boot procedures, i.e., when the USB drive goes in the idle state, waiting for instructions by the host device. Despite the considerations previously done for the legacy rmware modi cations are still applicable to this a ack, we also observe that MAGNETO can be extended to detect the previously mentioned a ack. By simply widening the observation window of the Emissions Extraction Module and recording the unintentional magnetic emissions when the USB device is in the idle state, MAGNETO can detect any anomalous operations initiated by the USB device, raising an immediate alarm. us, MAGNETO can be extended to guarantee the safe usage of any USB ash drive over an arbitrarily large time a er the USB device has been connected to the host system. More powerful adversaries could adopt more sophisticated strategies. For instance, they could tie the execution of the malicious code to a le transfer operation on the particular USB ash drive. When a le is transferred to (or from) the drive, the malicious code is triggered. e e ectiveness of MAGNETO against this a ack could still be achieved by ngerprinting also a le transfer operation, assuming that a le transfer of a given size leads to the same pro le of the unintended radiated emission. To neutralize our countermeasure, the adversary could always trigger the execution of the malicious code in a way to be tied to the size of the le to be transferred (e.g., greater than 10 MB). In this case, MAGNETO would be e ective only if the pro le of the unintentional magnetic emissions for the speci c le transfer operation has been recorded and pro led before, during the Training Mode. It follows that ngerprinting all these operations would a ect also the latency and the usability of MAGNETO, increasing the testing time and the overall size of MAGNETO. However, if the a ack is triggered only when a speci c le stored on the USB is opened, MAGNETO cannot be e ective without any previous ngerprinting process on that speci c le. Finally, we stress that MAGNETO can detect a tampered USB device where either the hardware or the legacy rmware of the speci c USB Flash Drive has been (maliciously) modi ed, and therefore, exhibit evident distortions in the unintentional magnetic emissions. We remark that the rmware of commercial USB ash drives is usually not public and very hard to be modi ed ex-post, as it is o en protected by intellectual property rights, not publicly available, and by multiple security layers deployed at manufacturing time.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed MAGNETO, a framework to enhance the security level in the usage of USB ash drives. Depending on the used equipment, MAGNETO can uniquely identify either the brand and the model of commercial USB ash drives, or the speci c USB ash drive, by analyzing unintentional magnetic emissions radiated by the target USB devices during the execution of the boot procedure. rough extensive experimental measurements on 23 di erent USB drives, including the top brands purchased on Amazon in June 2019, we demonstrated that a USB ash drive can be ngerprinted by only looking at the magnetic emissions unintentionally radiated during the boot procedure on a given host. When coupled with a commercial low-cost So ware De ned Radio such as the HackRFOne, MAGNETO can identify the speci c brand and model of the USB ash drive with a minimum classi cation accuracy of the 98.29%, guaranteeing, at the same time, zero false positives. When coupled with more expensive equipment, characterized by a wide analysis bandwidth of at least 200 MHz, MAGNETO can also identify the speci c USB ash drive with a 97.5% accuracy and zero false-positives. All the results above can be obtained almost in real-time, analyzing a time-frame of at most 3.35 seconds and requiring a negligible processing time (always less than 1 second on a standard laptop).
anks to the reported outstanding performance, MAGNETO emerges as a viable option to strengthen the security of any sensitive computing equipment, such as the one in a telco-backbone or a power plant, and in general contributing to the security of critical infrastructure systems.
